Why private credit default rates and private equity interim marks have lost precision, and what allocators should evaluate instead in 2026.
In BIP Capital’s view, manager dispersion in private markets is widening in 2026 partly because standard diligence signals have lost precision. Published private credit default rates now range from about 2.4% to over 6% depending on definition, and private equity distributions have fallen well below their historical pace relative to reported value.
The observation that manager selection matters more in private markets than in public ones is widely accepted. Many managers make a version of the argument, and repeating it adds little to an investment committee’s thinking.
The more useful question is why dispersion is widening now, in this particular cycle, rather than treating it as a permanent structural fact of the asset class. In BIP Capital’s view, the answer running through both private credit and private equity in 2026 is not primarily about manager skill. The instruments allocators have long relied on to identify a deteriorating manager before the deterioration becomes expensive have lost much of their precision. A low default rate in credit and a strong interim mark in equity no longer carry the information a diligence process built over the last two decades assumes they carry. Dispersion is the visible symptom; the weakening of the standard signal is a central cause.
Why has the private credit default rate become a weaker signal?
The private credit default rate is not one number. Proskauer’s Private Credit Default Index, which tracks senior-secured and unitranche loans in the United States, recorded 2.41% for the third quarter of 2026, its second consecutive quarterly decline.1 Measured more broadly, the picture changes. Fitch Ratings reported a U.S. private credit default rate of 6.0% at mid-2026, rising to a record 6.1% in July, on a definition that captures distressed exchanges such as PIK deferrals and maturity extensions. Lincoln International put the default rate at 2.7% at mid-year on covenant default events, but 6.2% once loans that added a PIK option after issuance were included.2 An allocator reading only the lowest of those figures would reasonably conclude the book is healthy.
The difference between the measures is largely the treatment of payment-in-kind interest used as a pressure valve rather than a structuring choice. Lincoln International found that 6.4% of the loans in its proprietary valuation database carried bad PIK in the fourth quarter of 2025, up from 2.5% in the fourth quarter of 2021. Lincoln describes that share as a possible shadow default rate: a proxy for situations that may otherwise have been defaults if not for a PIK election made because of tight liquidity.3 Under narrower definitions, a loan converting to PIK under strain is recorded as an amendment rather than a default. That is the distinction that has become hard to rely on.
How much early-warning protection have covenants lost?
The second shift in private credit is the thinning of the early-warning architecture, concentrated in larger transactions. Proskauer found that 21% of private credit deals in its 2025 dataset were covenant-lite, up from 4% in 2023.4 Goldman Sachs Research, using KBRA DLD data, put the covenant-lite share of U.S. direct lending deals at 14% in 2025 and found that deals carrying two financial covenants fell from 42% in 2023 to 27% in 2025, in favor of single-covenant structures. Covenants were still more likely to be present than absent in private credit, compared with 92% of loans in the USD leveraged loan index being covenant-lite.5 Cambridge Associates has noted that upper-middle-market lenders have long accepted the absence of maintenance covenants, while lower-middle-market lenders have largely maintained covenant discipline.6
Where maintenance covenants are absent, stress tends to surface later and more abruptly, because the test that once forced a lender and borrower to the table before a missed payment is not there. The Financial Stability Board’s May 2026 report on private credit pointed in the same direction, identifying valuation opacity and the lack of granular fund- and loan-level data among the sector’s vulnerabilities.7
Is private credit broadly impaired?
None of this describes a broadly impaired private credit market, and it is important to be precise about that. Proskauer characterized its declining index as a sign of continued resilience and reported that default rates in the software and technology sector remained stable in the second quarter of 2026 despite heavy market attention.8 Some of this year’s anxiety has been sentiment: the CAIA Association reported that, within weeks of new AI product launches, investors sought to pull more than $10 billion from private credit funds on fears of software exposure, and noted that actual redemptions from many semi-liquid vehicles are capped at 5% of NAV by design.9
Both things are true at once: some of the fear is overstated, and the instruments allocators use to tell overstated fear from real deterioration are less precise than they were. That combination is what makes this a manager-selection problem rather than an asset-class problem. When the shared signal weakens, the distance between the manager who underwrote conservatively all along and the one who reached for yield can widen without being visible, until something forces it into view.
Why has DPI become a more important private equity metric?
The parallel issue in private equity is the same weakening of the standard signal, expressed through a different metric. For most of the last cycle, an allocator could read a manager’s interim IRR and unrealized marks as a reasonable proxy for eventual realized performance. That proxy has weakened. McKinsey’s Global Private Markets Report 2026 found that DPI as a share of total private equity AUM was 6% in the 12 months ended June 2025, against a 2015–2019 average of 16%, and that five-year rolling DPI as a share of AUM hit its lowest recorded level, about 10%, in June 2025.10 Capital that a mark says exists is being returned as cash more slowly, and the gap between reported value and realized value has grown wide enough that the two should not be treated as interchangeable.
This is why DPI has moved up the scorecard. In McKinsey’s survey of 300 LPs, DPI is now tied with MOIC as the second-most-important metric shaping allocation decisions, with IRR still the leading focus.10 DPI is the one number in the private equity toolkit that a favorable mark cannot hold up, because it records only cash that has moved. The picture is not uniformly weak: McKinsey also reported that buyout distributions exceeded capital calls in 2025 for the second year in a row.10 And 2025’s recovery was narrow. Bain & Company reported that buyout deal and exit values reached their second-highest levels on record, but that 13 deals above $10 billion accounted for 30% of global buyout deal value.11
Where do private equity returns need to come from now?
The value-creation data tells a related story from the manager’s side. In the era of low rates and rising multiples, a mediocre manager and a strong one could post similar interim marks, because multiple expansion and leverage helped most portfolios. Bain’s 2026 report argues that strong returns now depend on significantly more operational improvement and revenue growth than in the prior era.11 In BIP Capital’s view, managers that built the operating capability to grow earnings are separating from those whose results depended on buying well and waiting, and the interim mark is often the last place that separation shows up.
What should an allocation committee read instead?
If widening dispersion were simply a matter of some managers being better than others, the response would be the familiar one: diligence harder, reference more thoroughly, weight the track record. That response is necessary but no longer sufficient, because it still leans on signals that have partially weakened. A track record reflects a rate environment that differs from today’s. An interim mark is a claim about value that the distribution data has not yet confirmed. A low default rate may be measuring a narrower category than the reader assumes.
The more demanding question a committee can ask of any private-market manager in 2026 is not only what its returns have been, but which of its reported signals can still be trusted, and what it takes to see the deterioration the standard metrics may hide. In credit, that means looking past a single default rate to the PIK trajectory, the covenant structure, and the manager’s willingness to mark honestly and early rather than to defer. In equity, it means weighting demonstrated distributions over interim marks, and examining the source of returns closely enough to distinguish operational value creation from the effects of leverage and multiple expansion.
In BIP Capital’s view, this is where the distinction between manager contribution and market contribution in private markets now rests. Access to the asset class is widely available, and exposure to both credit and equity is offered through more vehicles than most allocators can evaluate. What this cycle has made scarce is the ability to read a manager accurately when the instruments the industry once relied on have lost precision. That is the practical content of “manager selection matters” in 2026: the tools many allocators still use may not be measuring what they appear to measure, and the managers who look strongest on today’s scorecard are not necessarily the ones who will look strongest in five years.
Sources
- Proskauer Rose LLP, “Proskauer’s Private Credit Default Index Reveals Rate of 2.41% for Q3 2026,” October 27, 2026.
- FTI Consulting, “What’s the State of the Restructuring Market? It Depends,” 2026, citing Fitch Ratings releases of July 30 and August 13, 2026, and Lincoln International mid-2026 data.
- Lincoln International, “The Lincoln Private Market Index Ends the Year with its Slowest Quarter of Growth in 2025.” Data as of Q4 2025; loans in Lincoln’s proprietary valuation database.
- Proskauer, Private Credit Insights Report (2026), as reported by PitchBook. Based on more than 450 deals.
- Goldman Sachs Research, “Key AUM, pricing and yield trends in private lending markets,” April 2026, using KBRA DLD data through year-end 2025.
- Cambridge Associates, “A New Era of Dispersion in Direct Lending Favors Disciplined Managers,” April 2026.
- Financial Stability Board, Report on Vulnerabilities in Private Credit, May 6, 2026.
- Proskauer Rose LLP, “Proskauer’s Private Credit Default Index Reveals Rate of 2.51% for Q2 2026,” July 28, 2026.
- CAIA Association, “Private Credit Redemptions, Defaults, and Wrappers, Oh My!” April 20, 2026.
- McKinsey & Company, Global Private Markets Report 2026, “Private equity: Clearer view, tougher terrain.”
- Bain & Company, Global Private Equity Report 2026 press release, February 23, 2026.

