Evergreen Structures Primer

Overview
Chapter
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Why Structure Literacy Now Matters

For most of private markets' modern history, the central question facing an advisory firm was access. Could a client participate in the asset class at all, given the minimums, the lockups, and the operational machinery of a drawdown fund? That question is now largely settled. Continuously offered, semi-liquid vehicles provide entry to private equity, private credit, and real assets at allocation-appropriate minimums, and capital has moved decisively toward them.

The scale of that movement is not in dispute, though its precise measurement is. Preqin counts 726 evergreen funds in market as of June 2025, up from roughly 520 at the end of 2023, a count that has approximately doubled over five years. New launches reached a decade high in 2025, with 123 vehicles introduced — 49 in private debt and 32 in private equity.

Evergreen funds in market

Funds in market, end of 2023
~520
Preqin
Funds in market, June 2025
726
Roughly double five years earlier
New launches in 2025
123
A decade high
2025 launches by strategy
49 / 32
Private debt / private equity

Source: Preqin, via S&P Global Market Intelligence (March 2026) and Acuity Analytics (May 2026), citing Preqin and PitchBook.

Asset totals depend heavily on definition, and the spread across providers is itself instructive. Preqin places evergreen net asset value near USD 427 billion as of June 2025, a figure that excludes European structures such as ELTIFs and LTAFs that do not fully disclose. MSCI reports the semi-liquid segment approaching USD 500 billion, having grown more than 30 percent over the twelve months through September 2025. PitchBook, on a United States basis, counts USD 457 billion across 486 semi-liquid evergreen funds at year-end 2025, more than half of them launched within the prior four years. Deloitte, using a narrower semi-liquid definition, records assets tripling between 2020 and 2024 to USD 349 billion.

Four providers, four totals: evergreen and semi-liquid assets (USD billions)

MSCI: semi-liquid segment (2025)~$500B
Approaching USD 500 billion; up 30%+ over 12 months through Sept. 2025
PitchBook: U.S. semi-liquid evergreen (YE 2025)$457B
486 funds; U.S. basis
Preqin: evergreen NAV (June 2025)$427B
Excludes ELTIFs and LTAFs that do not fully disclose
Deloitte: narrower semi-liquid definition (2024)$349B
Tripled from 2020

Source: Preqin (June 2025); MSCI (2025); PitchBook via Morgan Stanley / Eaton Vance (year-end 2025); Deloitte via IQ-EQ (January 2026).

The disagreement is the point. Four credible providers report four different totals because “evergreen” is not a single, cleanly bounded category. It spans registered interval funds, tender-offer funds, non-traded business development companies, and private feeder structures, across multiple jurisdictions and disclosure regimes. An allocator who treats these vehicles as interchangeable because they share a fact-sheet vocabulary — continuous subscription, periodic liquidity, net-asset-value pricing — is underwriting the label, not the structure.

This is the differentiation for an investment committee. The access question has been answered. The evaluation question has become harder, not easier, because the structural variation that a closed-end commitment never forced anyone to examine now sits at the center of the decision. Wealth investors already represent roughly one-fifth of private market assets under management, and the largest managers have organized their growth around the continuously offered wrapper. Structure literacy is no longer a specialist concern. It is a core allocation competency.

Source: MSCI (2025).

The thesis of this primer: an evergreen vehicle is a structural innovation, not an asset class. It repackages exposure to the same underlying private assets inside a continuously offered wrapper with periodic liquidity. It changes the investor’s cash-flow experience, the reporting cadence, and the operational burden. It does not remove the illiquidity, manager dispersion, or valuation opacity of the assets underneath. Evaluating one therefore requires a second layer of diligence that closed-end diligence never demanded: the diligence of the wrapper itself.

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